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Abstract: In this introduction we consider the relationship between the European Group 
for the Study of Deviance and Social Control [European Group] and the promotion of non-
penal real utopias. The article begins by considering the historical connections between the 
New Left, utopian ideas, abolitionism and critical criminology, highlighting the role played 
by the European Group in the development of utopian thought. It then considers the utopian 
imagination in critical criminology, paying particular attention to Penal Abolitionism and 
Zemiology as utopia. It briefly analyses the crisis of utopia undergone by critical criminology 
in the 1980s before moving on to discuss the recent reawakening of the utopian 
criminological imagination and discussing the normative framework on which it should be 
based. Finally, it highlights the importance of developing of an emancipatory politics and 
praxis. 
 
Introduction: The utopian imagination  
Since the publication of Thomas More’s Utopia (1516) some 500 years ago, the concept 
of utopia has been applied in widely different ways. It has taken on both a negative and 
positive meaning (Malloch and Munro, 2013). When used negatively, it is so as an insult: 
it is a way of ridiculing an idea as unrealistic, impractical and hopelessly idealistic. This 
dismissive use of the term draws upon the original Latin meaning of utopia as ‘nowhere’. 
It regards utopia as the impossible dream, something/ somewhere which does not exist. 
This view was particularly marked with the advent of neoliberal consensus politics 
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 following the failure of utopian experiments across the world in the post-war period. This 
led to a ‘crisis of utopias’ (Duménil, 2016) and the assertion of TINA politics2 advancing 
neoliberalism as the only possible programme adapted to the new realities of globalised 
capitalism.  
 However, there is an equally strong tradition using the term utopia in a positive 
sense. In this tradition, which unites thinkers from a broad range of perspectives such as 
feminism, anarchism, socialism and religious beliefs such as Christianity, the word 
‘utopia’ is defined as ‘a good place’, as an ideal and desirable potential alternative to the 
present. The French economist, Gérard Duménil, describes utopias as follows: 
Highly optimistic projections towards a future of emancipation and 
humanity. Only utopias are capable of mobilising activist energies beyond 
societies based on class distinctions and neoliberal desperation, whilst 
recognising that the process will be long and that perfection does not exist. 
From the Enlightenment and the French revolution through to the 
formation of the workers’ movement, a tremendous wave of hope rose up 
– only to turn to tragedy in countries which called themselves socialist. We 
need to start from scratch after having understood the reasons for this 
failure (Duménil, 2014)3. 
So, although utopia is seen as a positive, emancipatory alternative to current injustices, it 
must be realistic. Those proposing utopian visions must be aware of their potential 
pitfalls and capable of critique, not just of the present, but also of past utopian 
experiments, in order to provide concrete, realistic utopian futures. We therefore 
strongly adhere to Wright’s idea of ‘real utopias’:  
utopian ideals that are grounded in the real potentials of humanity, utopian 
destinations that have accessible waystations, utopian designs of 
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 institutions that can inform our practical tasks of navigating a world of 
imperfect conditions for social change (Wright, 2010: 4). 
A real utopia is something which already exists. Yet, whilst it is part of the present 
landscape, it is grounded in principles and values that can be considered as going against 
the countervailing norms of our advanced capitalist, neo-colonial and patriarchal society. 
We argue that this concrete and already existing real utopia can help feed our imagination 
and help inspire us to formulate radical alternatives to society and its institutions. In this 
sense the real utopia can help us ‘visualise’ new possibilities and foster a dramatic break 
with the present. It can provide a conduit in which we can transform everyday life and 
promote emancipatory change (Levitas, 1990). Like the ‘good place’ of the utopian 
imaginary, a real utopia provides us with a vision of an alternative, but this alternative is 
not simply in the mind – it is one which is rooted in concrete realities. The realism of this 
utopian vision adds plausibility and feasibility to its promotion. It indicates that the 
proposed alternative is possible within our given historical conjuncture: the alternative 
is historically immanent and potentially ripe for further development or expansion. For 
Erik Olin Wright (2010 and this volume) the idea of ‘real utopias’ embraces this tension 
between dreams and practice. It is grounded in the belief that what is pragmatically 
possible is not fixed independently of our imaginations, but is itself shaped by our visions. 
 Thus, and hugely significantly, the real existence of the utopian practice can 
disrupt the ideological closure of the dominant institutions and practices of the present. 
It highlights how we can influence the present and realise a new ‘good place’ (Levitas, 
1990). A currently existing utopian practice can provide a firm basis for critique and 
illuminate a pathway to radical change. Significantly, focusing on such a ‘good place’ – a 
real utopia – also provides an opportunity for critics of the existing society to define 
themselves positively in terms that this is something that they are for, rather than just 
 what they are against – the bad place. This has underscored what David Scott (2013) has 
called an ‘abolitionist real utopia’ which envisages non-penal alternatives that are 
present in the here and now that can be drawn upon as a means of facilitating radical 
transformations of handling conflicts and responding to problematic and troublesome 
behaviours. Such as position is abolitionist because it based upon a clear set of normative 
principles and values; it uses this normative framework to assess, evaluate and critique 
the legitimacy of existing institutional practices and social structures, and where 
appropriate call for change; has a strategy for transformation grounded in emancipatory 
politics and praxis; and, finally, has a vision of non-penal ‘real utopian’ alternatives that 
are consistent with its normative framework (Scott, 2013).   
The word ‘dystopia’ – which literally means ‘bad place’ – was introduced into the 
modern lexicon in 1747 by Henry Lewis Younge. Dystopia is often presented as a vision 
that is in direct opposition to ‘utopia’. However, there is no neat separation between 
utopias and dystopias. For Terry Eagleton (1999:31) ‘all utopia is thus at the same time 
dystopia’ because both the positive and negative possibilities stretching into possible 
futures inevitably remind us that our current ‘bondage’ is historically contingent and that 
we must somehow break from the constraints of our historic conjuncture. Dystopias can 
also of course justify the present penal state by conjuring an image of an even worse 
future. They can frighten us into ‘no change’ and make people look backwards rather than 
forwards for visons of human communities. But the critical use of dystopia may also 
facilitate radical change for it can also be seen as a warning of what will happen if we 
continue to follow current trends and practices. In pointing us towards the worst possible 
scenario, dystopias provide a warning from the future in our present. They give us new 
eyes to look at how current developments may evolve. Dystopias then also give us new 
ways of seeing and critiquing power, domination and exploitation: 
 Whereas utopia takes us into a future and serves to indict the present, 
dystopia places us directly in the dark and depressing reality, conjuring up 
a terrifying future if we do not recognise and treat its symptoms here and 
now. Thus the dialectic between the two imaginaries, the dream and the 
nightmare, also beg for inclusion together. (Gordon et al 2010:2) 
Dystopic analysis then damns contemporary penal realities by projecting the critics’ 
worst fears onto current penal realities – something which has in recent times been 
especially associated with the work of Loic Wacquant (2013) and his critique of the penal 
state, which provides a nightmare vision of a future of less freedom and more 
penalisation and social control unless we act urgently to stop current punitive 
developments. In other words, whereas ‘utopias seek to emancipate by envisioning a 
world based on new, neglected, or spurned ideas; dystopias seek to frighten by 
accentuating contemporary trends that threaten freedom’ (Jacoby, 2005: 12).  
 As Stan Cohen (1988) has highlighted, both dystopia and utopia are part of the 
tradition of critical criminology with its focus on both the ‘dark side’ of human 
interactions – such as social controls, state repression, dehumanising institutional 
practices – and on the ‘light side’ of these same interactions – such as the principles of 
libertarian socialism and visions of a more free society grounded in our cherished ‘values 
and preferences’ (Cohen, 1985: 248). The utopia / dystopia coupling is evident in the 
work of Cohen, and especially his magnum opus Visions of Social Control. In this text 
Cohen (1985) drew extensively upon the dystopian vision of George Orwell’s 1984 to 
provide a vocabulary and imagery of contemporary ‘social control talk’ in the ‘punitive 
city’. Whilst dystopias such as Orwell’s may well breed feelings of despair and sadness 
they have also brought with them an imagery and vocabulary that can help us understand 
the present – Orwell’s (1949) descriptions of ‘big brother’, ‘Room 101’, as well as many 
of the other euphemisms that permeate his classic text, are now all part of modern-day 
understandings of state repression and a short-hand way of critiquing current policies 
 and practices. Yet, in Visions of Social Control, Cohen takes care to remind us of the 
importance of utopian visions. Though highlighting his concerns around ‘sentimental 
anarchism’ (Cohen, 1985: 35) and the ‘flaws in beautiful theory’ (Ibid: 268) he tells us 
that much can still be done. Indeed, his ‘preference is to be pragmatic about short term 
possibilities but to be genuinely utopian about constructing long-term alternatives’ (Ibid: 
252). In fact, despite his often dystopian tone, Cohen never loses his desire for building a 
new more ‘utopian’ society on the principles of mutual aid, fraternity and good-
neighbourliness (Ibid: 267). 
 The task that all the contributors to the current volume have set themselves is to 
develop practical alternatives to dystopian penal futures. This entails imagining non-
penal alternatives to current repressive policies which fail to address the underlying 
inequalities leading to social harm. In an attempt to better understand these visions, we 
situate them in their recent history, that is the development of critical criminology (also 
referred to as the ‘new criminology’4), notably within the European Group, from the 
1960s onwards.  
 
The ‘New Criminology’ and the ‘New Left’  
The ‘critical’ criminology that emerged from the 1960s onwards was very much a product 
of its time. Like the new social movements that were developing, it set itself against the 
prevailing norms of patriarchal, authoritarian, capitalist society, questioning the status 
quo and promoting radical democratic alternatives to existing repressive practices. It was 
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 highly critical of institutionalised criminological endeavours which reinforced existing 
power structures by accepting state-defined definitions of ‘crime’ and deviance. Rather 
than seeing ‘crime’ as a phenomenon just waiting to be discovered, it argued that it is 
political in nature, defined and responded to by those in power. As such, it has no 
ontological reality – like deviance, it is a social construction reflecting the interests of the 
powerful, especially by deflecting attention from the social harms produced both directly 
and indirectly by the political and economic elites.  
 The new criminologists thus sought to develop their own understanding of ‘crime’, 
deviancy and social harm, independent from those promoted by individuals in positions 
of power. Feeding off the new sociological studies of the 1960s, notably in America, which 
aimed to understand deviancy from below by working closely with the so-called deviants 
in an attempt to understand their behaviour from within, they followed Howard Becker 
(1967) in deliberately ‘choosing sides’. Rather than lining up with the rule-enforcers, 
whose viewpoint tends to be disproportionately represented on account of the fact that 
they sit at the apex of what Becker described as the ‘hierarchy of credibility’, the new 
criminologists attempted to give a voice to the subjects of the rule-enforcers in order to 
discover new social worlds or at least develop a new understanding of those we 
previously thought we were familiar with (Becker, 1967: 105). The new criminologists 
explored lived realities and experiences, engaging directly with people to understand 
their world view, thus contributing to an entirely new conception of deviancy. Their new 
studies of deviancy adopted an interactionist approach to the analysis of deviant 
behaviour, displacing the emphasis on individual pathologies towards the wider social 
and structural context in which the deviant acts.  
 The critical approach adopted by new deviancy criminology was largely a reaction 
against positivism, notably its claims to scientific neutrality or what Bourdieu described 
 as ‘the falsely rigorous observations of positivism’ (Bourdieu and de Saint Martin, cited 
in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 27-8). Taylor, Walton and Young, the radical 
proponents of what they called the ‘new criminology’ explained: 
The evocation of natural science presents the positivist with a powerful 
mode of argument. For the system of thought which produces miracles of 
technology and medicine is a prestigious banner under which to fight. It 
grants the positivist the gift of ‘objectivity’; it bestows on his 
pronouncements the mantle of ‘truth’; it endows his suggestions of 
therapy, however threatening, to individual rights and dignity, with the air 
of the inevitable (Taylor, Walton and Young, 2003 [1973]: 32). 
The positivist approach which had dominated criminology since at least the end of the 
19th century was in many ways more akin to a religion than a science (Gouldner, 1968: 
116) to the extent that it tended to reify empirical data thought capable of revealing the 
truth. It ignored the fact that data is often detached from reality since it ignores the 
cultural and ideological contexts in which it is collected, leading to ‘abstracted 
empiricism’ (Mills, 2000 [1959]).  
 The new criminology specifically reacted against abstracted empiricism, 
attempting to place social problems in their political context. For David Matza, the study 
of ‘crime’ and deviance necessarily had to be linked to the study of the State given that it 
is the State alone that has the power to criminalise and construct ‘deviance’ (1964; 1969). 
It was necessary to situate individual acts in their historical and structural context in 
order to develop a political economy of ‘crime’ (Taylor et al., 1973) capable of recognising 
that criminalisation is not a simple response to ‘crime’ but rather a means of exercising 
social control and neutralising resistance. For Taylor et al., ‘the wider origins of the 
deviant act could only be understood... in terms of the rapidly changing economic and 
political contingencies of advanced industrial society’ (ibid.: 270). 
 Consequently, the new criminology did not limit its focus to the marginalised and 
‘deviant’. It also directed its critical gaze upwards in an attempt to understand the 
 political need to control deviance. In Policing the Crisis, Stuart Hall et al. (1978/2013) 
argued that state reactions to ‘crime’ could only be understood in the context of the social 
and political crisis of the 1970s, namely the ‘crisis of hegemony’ that was in the process 
of undermining the political legitimacy of the State and its agents. ‘Policing the crisis’ 
meant attempting to stem the tide of unrest and to seek political legitimacy by 
scapegoating ‘deviants’ – often young black men – for contemporary social problems. 
Such work, often considered prophetic in its dystopian vision of the rise of ‘iron times’ 
and authoritarian populist policies retrenching the welfare state, was taken forward by 
long-time European Group member Phil Scraton in the important edited text Law, Order 
and the Authoritarian State (1987) which furthered understanding of the discriminatory 
and often brutal practices of the criminal justice system by placing them in the context of 
the Thatcher governments’ need to strengthen the power of the State as a means of 
containing the unrest resulting from their social and economic policies. This entailed a 
significant reframing of the terms of the debate about ‘crime’ by situating ‘crime’ control 
in the wider context of political crisis and social divisions (Sim et al, 1987).  
Crucially, the study of ‘crime’ and deviancy entailed the study of power relations. 
As such, criminology became political. The criminologists seeking to understand the 
power relations which underpinned social control practices could not be ‘bureaucratic 
intellectuals’ (Merton, 1945), ‘servants to power’ (Christie, this volume) or ‘social 
engineers’ (Bourdieu, 2000) working to please state institutions and serving simply to 
‘rationalise the practical or pseudo-scientific knowledge that the powerful have of the 
social world’ (ibid.)5, providing ideological programmes with scientific legitimacy 
(Chomsky, 2008 [1966]: 55) and masking state repression. The new criminologists were 
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 politically engaged and their studies inextricably linked to the politics of the new left and 
its project to link the personal and the political and to and formulate a political 
programme capable of challenging existing power structures. They did not just promote 
radical social change in the criminal justice system but also in broader power relations, 
engaging in a socialist critique of harms, power and repression that demands the 
organisation of society along the lines of solidarity, equality and mutuality (Tifft and 
Sullivan, 1980). The new criminologists adopted an explicitly normative position 
entailing the abolition of inequalities of wealth and power in order ‘to create the kind of 
society in which the facts of human diversity…are not subject to the power to criminalise’ 
(Taylor, Walton and Young, 1973: 282). This entailed joining with other social 
movements in order to bring the ‘outsiders’ in, thus promoting social, racial and gender 
justice.  
 
Bringing the ‘outsiders’ in 
Feeding off the civil rights movement of the 1960s, the new criminology was especially 
concerned with race issues. Stuart Hall and his colleagues highlighted the racialisation of 
street ‘crime’, notably mugging, demonstrating how the demonisation of black youths by 
the institutions of the State and the media created an authoritarian consensus around 
repressive state power (1978). Policing the Crisis effectively demonstrated how ‘race’ 
issues were tightly bound together with questions of power and legitimacy. Along with 
other seminal texts, such as Paul Gordon’s White Law (1983), the book helped to highlight 
the institutionalised racism endemic to the post-colonial British state long before the 
publication of the Macpherson Report (Macpherson, 1999).6 Hall et al’s work helped to 
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 spark a whole range of studies into the disproportionate criminalisation of people of 
colour which highlighted the racialised bias inherent in official state definitions of ‘crime’. 
Paul Gilroy (1987), in particular, investigated the myth of Black criminality which has 
been used to justify the over-representation of Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) 
communities in detention and in police stop and search statistics (see, for example, 
Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2015). Picking up on the earlier work of Paddy 
Hillyard on the Irish (1993), Pantazis and Pemberton (2009) have drawn attention to the 
existence of Muslims as new ‘suspect communities’ in the UK, considered as an ‘enemy 
within’ and specifically targeted by state surveillance on account of their ethnic 
appearance rather than on the grounds of their behaviour.  
 Carol Smart’s ground-breaking Women, ‘crime’ and Criminology (1976) helped to 
bring feminist issues to the forefront of critical criminology. The text highlighted the 
limitations of ‘malestream’ criminological and penological thought and noted that 
criminological analysis had been in the main be ‘written for men, by men and about men’. 
The ontological and epistemological assumptions of ‘malestream criminology’ could not 
just ‘add in women’ to address its defects. Rather, there needed to be a new feminist 
epistemology, asking very different questions and grounded in sometimes very different 
values and principles. Feminist thought opened the pathway for thinking more critically 
about gender and sexuality – it opened up neglected dimensions not only about the 
experience of women but also started to ask questions about what it meant to be a man 
(Heidensohn, 1985; Collier 1998). By placing new emphasis on both concerns about the 
role of law, societal expectations and power relations regarding both masculinities and 
femininities, the feminist critique led to a new openness and creativity when thinking 
about knowledge production and mechanisms of social control.  
  Critical criminology has continued its connection with feminisms and broader 
social movements fighting against various forms of injustice and discrimination. Most 
recently, for example, the specific issues affecting LGBTIQ7 groups, notably the use of the 
law to reinforce normative gender roles, have been highlighted by queer criminology 
(Dwyer, Ball and Crofts, 2015). Following on from the National Deviancy Conferences8 of 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, the European Group has been particularly concerned to 
connect to contemporary social movements, linking concerns about the repressive 
apparatuses of the state with wider issues of social justice and equality.  
 
The European Group, critical criminology and social justice 
The European Group was the brainchild of three well-known radical social theorists: Stan 
Cohen, then at Durham University, England; Mario Simondi, from the University of 
Florence, Italy; and Karl Schuman from Bielefeld University in Germany (Gilmore et al, 
2013). They proposed the formation of an alternative critical criminology forum which 
would not just cover topics and hold debates marginalised or ignored by mainstream, 
administrative criminology but also establish a new network that could support, and 
provide solidarity with, emerging social movements (Swaaningen, 1997). Recognising 
the dominant influence of Anglo-American criminology, this new forum was to be 
characterised by a distinct European focus. The sense of place was to be significant on a 
further level, linking the conference theme with the conference location and offering 
support to local political activists, for example through press releases and resolutions and 
sometimes even joining them on demonstrations. Part of the very first conference held in 
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 Florence in 1973 (on the theme of Deviance and Social Control in Europe: Scope and 
Prospects for a Radical Criminology) was suspended so that participants could join a 
demonstration of 15,000 people against the overthrow of the democratic Chilean 
government of Salvador Allende. The conferences have thus always sought to move 
beyond the purely theoretical and outside the fixed boundaries of academia, joining 
together with activists to seek to bring about concrete political and social change. The 
Group was significantly inspired by, and in regular contact with, other radical activist 
groups such as: the radical German lawyers’ group; the Groupe d’Information sur les 
Prisons (GIP) founded by Michel Foucault in 1971 in order to give a voice to prisoners and 
inform the public about their daily lived experience; and the abolitionist movement led 
by the Norwegian criminologists Nils Christie and Thomas Mathiesen which aimed to 
bring together activists, academics and prisoners to explore means of conflict resolution 
outside the logic of the formal criminal justice system (Christie, 1981; Mathiesen, 1974). 
In common with all these movements, the European Group was shaped by an unequivocal 
commitment to social justice (Scott, 2012). 
 By emphasising the study of deviancy and social control, the founders fashioned 
the political and theoretical priorities of the European Group (Scott, 2012). Through the 
notion of deviancy, they highlighted, among other things, the importance of 
understanding the essentially contested notions of ‘crime’ and disorder. Stan Cohen and 
colleagues pointed to the political nature of the construction of ‘legitimate’ protest and 
the intricate relationship between private troubles and public issues. In other words, the 
European Group set about to critically explore how understandings of human biography 
were fundamentally located within the historical and structural contexts of a given 
society (Mills, 1959). Further, by scrutinising the ‘organised ways in which society 
responds to behaviour and people it regards as deviant, problematic, worrying, 
 threatening, troublesome or undesirable in some way or another’ (Cohen, 1985: 1), 
manifestations of social control such as migration and border controls, policing, the 
judiciary, detention and authoritarian statism, were placed firmly in the spotlight 
(Swaaningen, 1997). This focus on deviancy and social control has continued, albeit in 
modified form, for over 40 years and is clearly reflected in the contributions to the 
present journal. 
 In September 2010 Stan Cohen indicated that in the early days of the European 
Group, there was ‘a strong anarchistic and libertarian ethos’ (personal correspondence 
with David Scott). As time has passed, the philosophies of Marxism, phenomenology, 
penal abolitionism, feminism, anti-racism and the insights of Michel Foucault, among 
others, have also proved influential. What unites such diverse and potentially 
contradictory philosophies are their critique of hierarchies of power and the call for 
progressive and emancipatory change rooted in alternative critical normative values 
(Swaaningen, 1997). Whilst the critique and transformation of class hierarchies remains 
important, the focus has gradually expanded to address much wider concerns around 
nationalism, heterophobia, racism, ability, ageism, hetero-normativity and sexual 
divisions. The European Group therefore aims to foster ‘emancipatory knowledge’ 
(Wright, 2010) which has the explicit political and theoretical intention of not just 
understanding individual and social problems, but also challenging and transforming 
existing power relations (Gilmore et al, 2013). It has thus consistently sought to feed a 
radical and utopian imagination. 
 
The radical imagination in critical criminology 
Although critical criminology, as it emerged in opposition to mainstream criminology and 
the broader injustices it helped perpetuate, initially focused on critique of existing 
 institutions and power structures, it soon began to propose radical and utopian 
alternatives to hegemonic visions of justice. This became increasingly necessary as 
dystopian visions of justice began to gain ground as the post-war welfarist consensus 
collapsed, only to be replaced a neoliberal consensus predicated on the logic of exclusion 
and rising social inequalities. Central to such a radical and utopian imagination in critical 
criminology has been a desire to promote justice, human flourishing and dignity, ethical 
responsibilities and reciprocal awareness, sympathy, mutuality and community (Tifft and 
Sullivan, 1980). Importantly, this entails finding new ways of framing issues and 
expanding our imagination regarding what is possible in the here and now. Below, we 
discuss two examples of what we mean by the radical and utopian imagination in critical 
criminology: Penal Abolitionism and Zemiology.  
 
Penal Abolitionism and the radical imagination 
Abolitionists recognise that prisons are inherently problematic institutions – they are 
places of interpersonal and institutional violence and legal, social and corporeal death – 
and these terrible outcomes are structured within the very fabric of penal institutions 
(Scott and Codd, 2010; Scott, 2013, 2015). It is possible that prisons can offer a place of 
reflection and refuge for a few people when all other options have failed but, given the 
deprivations, pains and iatrogenic harms that underscore daily prison regimes, these 
cases are the exceptions that prove the rule. Abolitionists, in common with anarchist 
thinkers such as Kropotkin (1976) and Tifft and Sullivan (1980), highlight the 
impossibility of reforming such dehumanising institutions: ‘A prison cannot be 
improved… there is absolutely nothing to do but demolish it’ (Kropotkin, 1976:45). It is 
indeed entirely illogical to hope to be able to respond to harms by coercion and violence 
 which do nothing to address the problems that may have led to such harms in the first 
place, merely exacerbating them. As Rene van Swaaningen has argued: 
At its core, criminal law … is based on … repressive assumptions … From 
the beginning it has been seen to create problems instead of solving them. 
A penal reaction after the fact is not preventive but de-socialises an ever-
increasing number of people. Therefore it would be better to abolish penal 
means of coercion, and to replace them by more reparative means. This 
briefly is the abolitionist message (1986:9). 
Similarly, Hulsman argues that the criminal justice system has an extraordinarily narrow 
focus, based as it is on limited state-defined notions of ‘crime’, that ignore the broader 
reality in which harmful behaviour may occur (Hulsman, 1986). He thus recommends 
studying strategies for abolishing criminal justice, namely ‘how to liberate organizations 
like the police and the courts [from] a system of reference that turns them away [from] 
the variety of life and the needs of those directly involved’ (1986: 80) This ‘liberation’ 
may only occur, however, once we move outside that frame of reference. It is therefore 
necessary to empower ordinary people – be they victims or offenders – involved in 
conflict to ensure that they may help to construct new frames of reference, ensuring that 
the authorities do not ‘have a monopoly on how to define what goes on in the relevant life 
world’ (Mathiesen, 2008: 61). It is thus imperative to challenge the very definition of 
‘crime’.  
 
Zemiology and the radical imagination 
Critical criminology has indeed constantly challenged traditional state-defined notions of 
‘crime’ and criminology which tend to ignore the existence of a considerable number of 
harms such as those perpetrated by the State itself, notably environmental, economic and 
social harms. The European Group, from its inception, has been involved in this task. 
Following on from the work of Tifft and Sullivan in the USA (1980), who sensitised us to 
 the importance of thinking about how harms (not just formally-defined crimes) prevent 
people from being fully human, researchers closely involved with the European Group, 
namely Paddy Hillyard, Steve Tombs, Christina Pantazis and Simon Pemberton, explored 
the alternative conception of ‘social harm’ (Hillyard et al., 2004). After discussions at a 
European Group Conference in Greece, Paddy Hillyard later adopted the term ‘Zemiology’ 
(drawing on the Greek word for harm), as an exhortation to academics and others to 
move beyond criminology which focuses on harm as defined by the criminal law towards 
a study of all forms of social harm, including those caused by the State. 
 
Neither of these examples of the radical imagination offer concrete alternatives to 
existing penal solutions but they do contribute to opening up utopian spaces in which 
new visions may be presented and enacted. They follow Mathiesen’s exhortation to 
sketch out alternative visions rather than providing elaborate blueprints for change 
(Mathiesen, 1974). They may both be considered ‘utopian’ in the sense that they provide 
visions of a ‘better place’ (Malloch and Munro, 2013): for Penal Abolitionism, this good 
place is where there is an end to penal harms; for Zemiology it is when harms – whether 
they be harms of (state or corporate) power directed against people, the ecological 
system, or non-sentient beings – have been curtailed (Walters et al, 2013). Yet, whilst 
utopianism and the radical imagination may be considered as one of the strengths of 
critical criminology, allowing it to go beyond the limited analyses of mainstream 
criminology, it has also been a source of tensions.  
 
Critical criminology and the ‘crisis of utopias’: from left realism to real utopias  
In the 1980s, critical criminology underwent its own ‘crisis of utopias’ as some of its more 
utopian aspects were criticised by the ‘left realists’ (Lea and Young, 1984; Young and 
 Matthews, 1986; Matthews, 2014). In some critical criminological writings, there was a 
certain utopian idealisation of those who broke the law. In rejecting deterministic and 
pathological explanations for ‘crime’, Taylor et al. regarded criminality as a form of 
resistance to the dominant capitalist order: 
So long as authority takes the form of domination, […] authority will always 
be problematic, and […] any acts of deviance or dissent must be taken to be 
acts of resistance (however inarticulately expressed or formulated) 
(Taylor et al., 2003 [1973]: 252). 
In this, there appeared to be a return to the classical criminological view of the criminal 
as a perfectly rational actor with the important distinction being that s/he does not 
choose ‘crime’ but resistance. S/he was even considered as a sort of working class hero 
or Robin Hood (Cohen, 1996: 4). The real problem was not considered to be that of ‘crime’ 
or the harm it caused, but of criminalisation.  
 The left realists argued that this focus on the social harm caused by 
criminalisation, whilst important, tended to deflect attention from the harm caused by 
criminal acts. Jock Young, one of the original authors of the New Criminology (1973), 
together with John Lea, argued that ‘crime’ must be taken seriously, especially by the Left 
since it is a problem that disproportionately affects poor communities. Instead of 
presenting the fear of ‘crime’ as an ideological construction without ontological reality, 
they aimed to measure the real extent of the problem through victims’ surveys. This was 
thought to be a way of making critical criminology policy-relevant and ensuring that law 
enforcement attended to social inequalities and was democratically accountable.  
 The idea that the ‘crime’ problem should not ‘belong’ to the Right was taken up in 
Britain by Tony Blair in 1996 when he declared: ‘Law and order is a Labour issue. We all 
suffer from “crime”, the poorest and vulnerable most of all’ (Blair, 1996: 68). Yet, New 
Labour appeared to be more influenced by ‘right realism’ when it came to discussing the 
 causes of ‘crime’. Following the conservative American sociologist Charles Murray 
(1996), it considered offenders as an ‘underclass’ that was culturally isolated from the 
mythological ‘law-abiding’ majority (Bell, 2011: 94-5). This image of the offender was 
radically opposed to that of the ‘left idealists’ (Young, 1979) but it was also very different 
from that originally proposed by the ‘left realists’. Indeed, in focusing on pathological 
causes of ‘crime’, New Labour ignored one of the key principles of ‘left realism’, namely 
the idea that capitalism itself can be criminogenic on account of its tendency to engender 
economic inequalities which feed feelings of relative deprivation. 
 That the structural causes of ‘crime’ should be ignored by politicians claiming to 
be inspired by left realism was no surprise to those who criticised the theory. Hillyard et 
al (2004)  argued that the left realists’ disproportionate focus on street ‘crime’ meant that 
other forms of harm, were neglected. Indeed, Zemiology emerged as a reaction against 
this focus on the most visible forms of ‘crime’. Contrary to what left realism seemed to 
suggest, Hillyard et al argue that critical criminologists did not want to play down the 
‘crime’ problem, above all for the poor, but they aimed to show that white collar ‘crime’ 
and harms perpetrated by the State and private corporations could be just as harmful as 
street ‘crime’ (Hillyard et al., 2004). Zemiology and Penal Abolitionism do not ignore the 
victims of ‘crime’. On the contrary, the proponents of both critical approaches argue that 
taking harm seriously mean that the notion of ‘victim’ must be understood in a much 
broader sense to include victims of social injustice rather than just of harm. 
 The turn towards realism was perhaps understandable in a dystopian political 
context, but it lost too much of its radical ‘utopian’ imagination and ended up being co-
opted by mainstream politicians in the 1990s who used it to justify penal repression. 
Today the ‘criminological imagination’ is threatened by a revival of positivism and a 
‘realist’ agenda promoting more evaluative research defined by the interests of policy 
 makers and government (Young, 2011) and thus placing a ‘straightjacket’ on critical and 
independent thought (Barton et al, 2006). The recent move towards taking harm 
seriously is not radically opposed to the left realists’ exhortation to take crime seriously 
but by reframing the terms of the debate, it permits a much broader focus on all forms of 
injustice. It also allows us to go beyond the somewhat idealistic notion of criminals as 
political actors by showing that those who cause harm are as likely to be situated at the 
top or the bottom of the social hierarchy. It is the social harm approach that lays the 
groundwork for a reawakening of a critical criminological imagination (Barton et al., 
2006; Copson, 2013) which may be capable of moving towards a new form of realism: the 
real utopia.  
 
Reawakening our radical imagination 
There is a pressing need to develop non-penal real utopias to provide a new cultural 
script and resources for a radical imagination to inspire transformative justice and 
emancipatory politics and praxis capable of moving beyond repressive penal dystopia. 
Inspired by abolitionism and the social harm approach, a non-penal real utopia should 
promote visions of radical alternatives. What is required is an alternative space 
designated to foster self-empowerment which utilises a holistic approach based upon 
principles of self-help and mutual aid. Non-penal interventions should help troubled 
individuals understand and, as far as possible, lessen or overcome their psychological, 
social and/or emotional issues and difficulties. It requires a democratic impulse aims to 
foster a balanced and supportive dialogue between clients and staff where agreement and 
consensus can be reached. Radical alternatives can aspire to engender respect for the self, 
the environment and other people and develop new skills for inter-personal 
communication and action.  
 By promoting values and principles, such as empowerment, participatory 
democracy and mutual aid, we can also point to the defects of the existing operation of 
the criminal law and to social injustice. Working backwards so to speak, the non-penal 
real utopia can be a way of proposing ideas and principles upon which the penal 
apparatus of the capitalist state can be judged. The daily workings of the intervention can 
help inform a normative framework challenging the pain, suffering, harm and death 
characterising the prison place. It thus gives us a solid and principled moral platform 
from which we can critique the failures of the penal law. Following Scott (2013), non-
penal real utopia must be grounded in the following five normative principles that build 
upon continuities and possibilities in our historical conjuncture (see also Scott and 
Gosling, this volume).  
  Non-penal real utopias must not be predicated upon the penal rationale – the 
intervention must not aim to penalise – it must be therefore be non-punitive. 
Because a non-penal real utopia must stand outside the criminal process, it should 
also reflect the need for radical restructuring and transformation rather than 
merely tinkering.  
 Non-penal real utopias must compete with, and contradict, current penal 
ideologies, discourses, policies and practices. Those in power must find it difficult 
to ignore or dismiss the proposed radical alternative but at the same it must be 
impossible for them to re-appropriate the alternative within the logic of the penal-
rationale.  
 Non-penal radical alternatives must be plausible and something that can be 
considered in place of a prison sentence.  
 Non-penal radical alternatives must have a non-punitive ethos aiming to uphold, 
respect and protect the intrinsic worth and value of human beings. There must be 
 no violations of human dignity, nor should the intervention create stigma, injury 
or harm. Care should therefore be taken to ensure that any proposed non-penal 
alternative intervention for handling conflicts does not become a form of 
punishment in disguise.  
 Non-penal real utopia must be grounded in lived experience and deeply rooted in 
the practices of everyday life. They must be examples that already exist and could 
be developed or expanded (Scott, 2013). 
Furthermore, non-penal real utopias should not be considered in isolation. Since the 
social harm that they seek to address is bound up with a whole range of other contextual 
issues, they need to be thought of as just one part of a project helping to inform a broader 
vision of social justice. They may do this by giving people the opportunity to see the world 
differently and encouraging them to understand the Other. At a time when social and 
economic insecurities are encouraging scapegoating, it is ever more important to foster 
a more reflective understanding of the causes of social problems. Indeed, the darker the 
times, the greater the need for enlightened thinking. The reflection upon the principles 
and practices of non-penal real utopias present us with a clear ability to reflect upon 
social injustice in contemporary society. It offers us a template of the ‘good life’, a space 
in which we not only challenge but can imagine new radical alternatives. It therefore has 
emancipatory potential, encouraging us to think more broadly about how the principles 
and values of social justice can work in practice. A non-penal real utopia may help us to 
see beyond the constraints of the present neo-liberal society that privileges the market 
above everything else, especially human need. 
 Thinking about non-penal real utopias must also be a collective endeavour if we 
are to hope to develop alternatives to current top-down, state-controlled penal practices. 
It is hoped that this collective exercise in imagination may help foster visions of a society 
 grounded in mutual aid and respect; democratic participation; communal living and 
equitable distribution of resources; and where people have a voice that is both heard and 
listened to. Thus, the radical alternative can provide us with a set of alternative values to 
neo-liberal capitalism and can inform constructive criticism of the present. The very act 
of awakening the utopian imagination may be constitutive of wide-ranging change. 
 
Moving forward: utopias and the non-penal 
The contributions to this special foundation issue of the journal Justice, Power and 
Resistance put forward some concrete examples of non-penal real utopian thinking and 
practice. They are all guided by a concern with justice, solidarity and emancipation, 
values which need to underpin any attempt to develop genuine alternatives to current 
penal practices. Following an abolitionist approach, they all adopt ‘an attitude of saying 
“no”’ (Mathiesen, 2008: 58), of critiquing existing dystopian institutions and practices 
and failed attempts at reform. Following a social harm approach, they focus their 
attention outside state-defined notions of ‘crime’ to explore all forms of harm, whether 
caused by individuals, corporations or state institutions. In doing so, they encourage us 
to think about these harms, and consequently of means of addressing them, in their wider 
social context.  
 It is to be hoped that the (re)awakening the critical criminological imagination in 
a real utopian direction will provide the basis of an ongoing debate which may lead to 
transformative, emancipatory change, thus offering a way out of the ‘crisis of utopias’. 
The task of critical criminology, together with progressive thinkers and activists, could 
not be more pressing. 
 
 References  
Barton, A., Corteen, K., Scott, D., Whyte, D. (eds.) (2006) Expanding the Criminological 
Imagination London: Routledge 
Becker, H. (1967) “Whose Side and We On?” in Social Problems Volume 14, No. 3 pp 239-
247 
Bell, E. (2011) Criminal Justice and Neoliberalism Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 
Blair, T. (1996) New Britain: My Vision of a Young Country London: Fourth Estate 
Bourdieu, P. (2000 [1972]) Esquisse d’une théorie de la pratique Paris : Seuil 
Bourdieu, P. and Wacquant, L. (1992) An Introduction to Reflexive Sociology Cambridge: 
Polity Press 
Chomsky, N. (2008) [1966] “The Responsibility of Intellectuals” in Arnove, A. (ed.), The 
Essential Chomsky London: The Bodley Head 
Christie, N. (1981) Limits to Pain Oslo: Oslo University Press  
Cohen, S. (1985) Visions of Social Control Cambridge: Polity Press 
Cohen, S. (1988) Against Criminology Cambridge: Polity Press 
Cohen, S. (1996) “Crime and Politics: Spot the Difference” in British Journal of Sociology 
Volume 47, No. 1 pp 1-21 
Cohen, S. (2010) (personal correspondence with David Scott, September, 20th) 
Collier, R. (1998) Masculinities, Crime and Criminology London: Sage 
Copson, L. (2013) “Towards a utopian criminology” in Malloch, M. and Munro, B. (eds) 
(2013) Crime, Critique and Utopia London: Palgrave 
Duménil, G. (2014) « Les utopies peuvent mobiliser les énergies », La Marseillaise, 9 
December.  
Duménil, G. (2016), seminar delivered to ‘Les amis de Veblen’, Lyon, 2 March.  
Dwyer, A., Ball, M. and Crofts, T. (2015) Queering Criminology Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan 
Eagleton, T. (1999) “Utopia and its Opposites” pp 31-41 in Panitch, L. & Leys, C. (eds) 
(1999) Necessary and unnecessary utopias: socialist register 2000 Rendlesham: 
Merlin  
Equality and Human Rights Commission (2015) Stop and Think: A critical review of the 
use of stop and search powers in England and Wales, 
http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/ 
sites/default/files/documents/raceinbritain/ehrc_stop_and_search_report.pdf  
Gilmore, J., Moore, JM and Scott, D. (eds) (2013) Critique and Dissent Ottawa: Red Quill 
Books 
Gilroy, P. (1987) “The Myth of Black Criminality” in Scraton, P. (1987) Law, Order and the 
Authoritarian State Milton Keynes: Open University 
Gordon, M.D., Tilley, H. and Prakash, G. (2010) “Utopia and dystopia beyond space and 
time” pp1-20 in Gordon, M.D., Tilley, H. and Prakash, G. (eds) (2010) 
Utopia/Dystopia: conditions of historical possibility Oxford: Princeton University 
Press 
Gordon, P. (1983) White Law: Racism in the police, courts and prisons London: Pluto Press 
 Gouldner, Alvin (1968) “The Sociologist as Partisan: Sociology and the Welfare State” in 
The American Sociologist Volume 3, No. 2 pp 103-116 
Hall, S., Critcher, C., Jefferson, T., Clarke, J., Roberts, B. (eds.) (1978) Policing the Crisis: 
Mugging, the State and Law and Order London: Macmillan 
Heidensohn, F. (1985) Women and Crime London: Macmillan  
Hillyard, P. (1993) Suspect Community London: Pluto Press 
Hillyard, P. Pantazis, C. Tombs, S. Gordon, D. (eds.) (2004) Beyond Criminology: Taking 
harm seriously London: Pluto Press 
Hulsman, L. (1986) “Critical Criminology and the concept of ‘crime’” in Contemporary 
Crises Volume 10, No. 1 pp 63-80 
Jacoby, R. (2005) Picture Imperfect: Utopian Thought for an Anti-Utopian Age New York: 
Columbia University Press 
Kropotkin, P. (1976) The Essential Kropotkin London: Macmillan 
Lea, J. and Young, J. (1984) What is to be Done About Law and Order? Harmondsworth: 
Penguin 
Levitas, R. (1990) The Concept of Utopia Oxford: Peter Lang 
Macpherson, W. (1999) The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, Cm 4262-I London: Home Office 
Malloch, M. and Munro, B. (eds) (2013) Crime, Critique and Utopia London: Palgrave 
Matthews, R. (2014) Realist Criminology Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan  
Mathiesen, T. (1974) The Politics of Abolition Oxford: Martin Robertson 
Mathiesen T (2008) “The Abolitionist Stance” in Journal of Prisoners on Prisons Volume 
17, No. 2 pp 58–63. 
Matza, D. (1964) Delinquency and Drift New Brunswick: Transaction 
Matza, D. (1969) Becoming Deviant New Jersey : Prentice Hall  
Merton, R. (1945) “The Role of the Intellectual in Public Bureaucracy” in Social Forces 
Volume 23, No. 4 pp 405-415 
Mills, C.W. (1959) The Sociological Imagination Oxford: Oxford University Press 
More, T. (1516) Utopia Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Orwell, G. (1949) 1984 Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Pantazis, C. and Pemberton, S. (2009) “From the ‘Old’ to the ‘New’ Suspect Community” 
in British Journal of Criminology Volume 49, No. 5 pp 646-666 
Scott, D. (2012) “The European Group for the Study of Deviance and Social Control” in 
Bell, E. (ed) (2012) No Borders Chambery: University of Savoie Press 
Scott, D. (2013) “Visualising an abolitionist real utopia: principles, policy and praxis” in 
Malloch, M. and Munro, B. (eds) (2013) Crime, Critique and Utopia London: 
Palgrave 
Scott, D. (2015) “Eating your insides out: interpersonal, cultural and institutionally-
structured violence in the prison place” in Prison Service Journal September, 2015 
 Scott, D. And Codd, H. (2010) Controversial Issues in Prison Maidenhead: Open University 
Press  
Scraton, P. (ed.) (1987) Law, Order and the Authoritarian State Milton Keynes: Open 
University 
Sim. J., Scraton, P. and Gordon, P. (1987) “Introduction” in Scraton, P. (ed.) (1987) Law, 
Order and the Authoritarian State Milton Keynes: Open University 
Smart, C. (1976) Women, Crime and Criminology London: Routledge and Keegan Paul 
Swaaningen, R. Van (1986) in Bianchi H. and Swaaningen R. Van (1986) Abolitionism: 
Towards a non-repressive approach to ‘crime’ Amsterdam: Free University Press  
Swaaningen, R. Van (1997) Critical Criminology: Visions from Europe London: Sage 
Taylor, I., Walton, P. and Young, J. (2003 [1973]) The New Criminology: For a Social Theory 
of Deviance London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 
Tifft, L. and Sullivan, L. (1980) The Struggle to be Human: Crime, criminology and 
anarchism Orkney: Cienfuegos Press 
Wacquant, L. (2013) “Crafting the neoliberal state: Workfare, prisonfare and social 
insecurity“ in Scott, D. (ed) (2013) Why Prison? Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 
Walters, R., Westerhuis, D.S. and Wyatt, T. (eds) (2013) Emerging Issues in Green 
Criminology London: Palgrave 
Wright, E.O (2010) Envisioning a Real Utopia Cambridge: Polity Press 
Young, J. (2011) The Criminological Imagination Cambridge: Polity Press 
Young, J. and Matthews, R. (eds) (1986) Realist Criminology Sage: London 
Young, J. (1979) “Left idealism, Reformism and Beyond: From New Criminology to 
Marxism” in Fine, B. et al (eds) Capitalism and the Rule of Law: From Deviancy 
Theory to Marxism London: Hutchinson 
